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Abstract 
Many of the Programs, Funds and Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 
were founded in the aftermath of the Second World War. The purpose of the 
creation of these organizations has long since been replaced by new ones. This 
thesis addresses the challenges experienced today by three of the most prominent 
UN Specialized Agencies, Funds and Programs, FAO, UNICEF and WFP. The 
thesis' research question is whether the funding mechanism of an aid organization 
(voluntary vs. assessment) is more likely to have implications on its reform and 
change ability? Theories derived from institutionalism have served as theoretical 
framework to answer the research question. The method utilized in this research is 
a structured, focused comparison. 
The findings indicate that voluntary funded agencies are more prone to comply 
with changes to its modalities and practices. However, the situation of FAO has 
for some time been characterized by bad governance and low efficiency and is 
therefore not valid as a representative for the specialized agencies when it comes 
to changing ability adaptation.  
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1 Introduction  
When the work on this paper began, it is within the context of an ongoing 
turbulent world economy. "Crisis" is a recurring word to describe the current 
layoffs, national debts and budgetary strains. Essentially, this is a description of 
the situation in the Eurozone, the U.S. and the West in general. But the recurring 
financial crises have of course an impact on human life worldwide. For example, 
the global food and fuel crisis of 2007-2008 pushed an additional 40 million 
people into hunger in 2008, hence raising the overall number of undernourished 
people in the world to 963 million compared to 923 million in 2007 (Mittal 
2009:1).  
 
Donors have responded to the increased development and relief requirements by 
doubling their financial contributions for UN development cooperation for the last 
15 years.1 However, studies have shown that the character of these contributions 
has fundamentally changed so that “core financing” to the UN's multilateral 
mandate has been shrinking while voluntary contributions earmarked for specific 
locations and issues have increased.2 A clear trend visible during the last years is 
how major aid donors have allocated below their commitments. The statistics on 
resource flows to developing countries shows that the DAC Members' Net 
Official Development Assistance in 2011 was 2,3% less than in 2010.3   
 
These changes in the financing of the UN agencies and programs are a major 
concern, as the lack of predictability of voluntary funding is having an impact on 
the sustainability of the organizations (Yussuf et al. 2007:6). Especially, this is 
having a negative impact in cases where major donors have sharply reduced 
funding, or withdrawn completely. Despite the changes in the financing of United 
Nations development cooperation, UN agencies and programs continues to deal 
                                                
1  See Mahn 2012 
2  Ibid 
3  http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/statisticsonresourceflowstodevelopingcountries.htm 
  2 
with its essential relief and developmental work in a rapidly changing 
environment. 
 
During the last decade there has been a discussion regarding aid efficiency4. A 
turning point for this direction could be related to the UN summit in 2000 where 
virtually all world leaders agreed on seven Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) for developing countries by the year 2015. The demands on efficiency 
targets were intensified in the Paris Declaration of 2005 in conjunction with the 
UN five-year review of the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). In the mid of it all, there are major ideological 
debates and contesting views on what makes aid efficient. The Americans 
William Easterly and Jeffrey Sachs have usually been representative of either 
contesting opinions with their influential work in this subject.5 
 
How has the aid debate influenced the decisions and policies governing 
allocations and amounts? And how is the situation for aid agencies today? 
Considering a call from Donors and scholars for efficiency, both regarding cost 
and methods, financing preferences of major donors and a world economy in 
crisis, have aid agencies changed in lights of these conditions?  
 
1.1 Purpose and research question 
The humanitarian society and international aid work of today is very different 
from the one started over 60 years ago. Some of the most prominent UN agencies 
were founded and given a mandate to combat problems completely different from 
the ones of today. UNICEF, for example, created by the United Nations General 
Assembly on December 11, 1946, to provide emergency assistance to children in 
countries that had been devastated by World War II is today active in areas such 
                                                
4 See Paris Declaration 2005 
5  See Easterly, William. (2006) The White Man’s Burden: How the West’s Efforts to Aid      
the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good; Sachs, Jeffrey. (2005) The End of Poverty: 
Economic Possibilities for Our Time.  
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as care and services for children orphaned and made vulnerable by HIV/AIDS, 
child protection from violence, exploitation and abuse and basic education and 
gender equality to name a few (MOPAN 2010:6-7). 
 
This paper is concerned with the state of the UN development cooperation, and 
how trends and conditions within the aid industry such as demands on higher aid 
efficiency, financial crises and the changing nature of funds has impacted it. Even 
though donors have more than doubled their financial contributions for UN 
development cooperation in the last 15 years, the character of these contributions 
have changed. More and more, donors are bilaterally earmarking contributions for 
projects that they prefer and for specific locations and issues while the share of 
"core financing", i.e. funding for the multilateral mandate of the UN's 37 
operational agencies, have been shrinking for years (Mahn 2012:1). 
 
The United Nations development cooperation system consists of specialized 
agencies, Funds and Programs working in fields such as development or 
humanitarian relief assistance. The specialized agencies of the United Nations are 
autonomous agencies reporting directly to the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC). Some examples of UN specialized organs are The Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Labour Organization (ILO), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). These agencies derive a large part of their 
income from the assessed contributions of Member States (Yussuf et al 2007:2). 
 
The specialized agencies are also at least partially funded by voluntary 
contributions. The United Nations Funds and Programs have been established to 
address a particular humanitarian and development concerns by the General 
Assembly to which it reports.6 Some examples of UN Funds and Programs are 
The United Nations Children's Fund  (UNICEF), United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and The World 
Food Programme (WFP). The Funds, Programs and other bodies established by 
the General Assembly are entirely, or almost entirely, funded by voluntary 
                                                
6  http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/structure/index.shtml 
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contributions (Yussuf et al. 2007:3). While many countries fail to pay their full 
assessments to the specialized agencies, the UN Programs and Funds remain even 
more vulnerable as they rely entirely on voluntary contributions from a handful of 
donor countries.7 
 
This paper is about institutional change and what drives organizations to take on 
reform. What is the institutional action of UN Agencies and Programs/Funds in 
times of financial crisis and donors who direct their contributions to activities and 
areas based on their own preferences, rather than assessed by the aid agencies 
themselves? How does aid organizations that are more focused in one or few areas 
gets affected by changes in donor preferences than organizations who spread their 
operations across several areas? Is the funding mechanism of an UN organization 
an explanatory factor to the responses to challenges and problems in the aid 
system? 
 
The research question for the thesis: 
 
1. How have the different types of UN agencies adjusted to the changing 
conditions of the aid industry, namely the emphasis placed on resources, donor 
preference and effectiveness/efficiency? 
2. Is the funding mechanism of an aid organization (voluntary vs. assessment) more 
likely to have implications on its reform and change ability? Is this more evident 
in times of financial crisis? 
 
A subordinated purpose is to investigate if also the thematic and operational focus of 
an aid agency has implications on the way it is affected by external stimuli.  
1.1.1 Limitations 
The scope of this paper limits to the organizational action and responses of three 
selected UN Specialized Agencies and Funds and Program to past and emerging 
challenges. This paper is not about to what extent aid actually achieves the goal of 
                                                
7  http://www.globalpolicy.org/un-finance/tables-and-charts-on-un-finance/the-financing-
of-the-un-programmes-funds-and-specialized-agencies.html 
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reducing poverty, or a study of the best performer among aid agencies. In terms of 
temporal limitations focus will mainly be on the period 2000 to the present.  
 
As the survey is limited to only investigate organizations of the UN (and within 
the UN system only one out of 17 Specialized Agencies and two out of 14 Funds 
and Programs), there is no great claim to present conclusions that speaks for all 
types of organizational activities. The empirical data and material has been limited 
to include only secondary material in the form of annual reports, policy 
documents (budgets, strategic plans etc.), evaluations made by Donors and 
partners to the investigated cases. 
 
The paper's research questions and aim lies within a rather unexplored issue. No 
similar research has been found. The changing nature of the contributions to the 
UN's development work has been treated extensively in recent years8 
1.1.2 Cases 
Two components have guided the selection of cases to compare. This being the 
variable that it’s believed to explain the phenomena I intend to investigate and the 
analysis units exposed to this explanatory variable. The explanatory variable is the 
funding mechanism of the analysis unit. Therefore, both assessments funded and 
voluntary funded UN organizations need to be selected as analysis units. The 
methodological purpose of this study is to perform a comparative (structured, 
focused) case study with few, similar cases (Esaiasson et al. 2007, ch. 6; George 
& Bennett 2005:67). Therefore, only one specialized agency will represent the 
assessment-funded case.  
 
There are currently 16 specialized agencies.9 A helpful method to narrow the 
selection of cases can be done by referring to the topic this thesis is seated in. 
Since this thesis is about international development, humanitarian assistance and 
aid, it is evident to focus on the specialized agencies (and funds and programs) 
                                                
8  Graham 2012; Yussuf et al 2007; UNDESA 2005 (ISBN 92-1-104620-3) 
9  Visit http://www.un.org/Overview/uninbrief/institutions.shtml to see a list of all 
specialized agencies. 
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that have in its mission statement development and poverty reduction. Out of the 
16 agencies only 3 (FAO, IFAD, World Bank) are in this thesis considered to fit 
within that scope. The World Bank is an interesting case especially since it also 
includes a special fund for the poorest countries (International Development 
Association IDA). However, the World Bank has not been included because it is 
funded and governed outside of the UN System.10 IFAD and FAO have both in its 
mandate and strategic framework to improve people’s food security, nutrition and 
also raising income levels.11 Out of this two specialized agencies, FAO has been 
chosen as the only case study to represent an assessment funded organization. The 
motivation for this is partly because of IFAD’s particular role as a lender rather 
than as an aid provider, which distinguishes it considerably from FAO and the 
other selected cases. Finally, the characteristics of FAO are similar to the ones of 
the other selected case studies following the principle of selecting cases that are as 
similar as possible except for the explanatory variable that is the focus of the 
investigation (Esaiasson et al. 2007:113).  
 
Another motivation for selecting FAO, although not so determining, is how FAO 
for a long time have been openly criticized for its inefficiency.12 It was here that 
the idea was brought on to examine whether certain UN organizations are better 
than other when it comes to respond to new challenges.  
 
Having established FAO as one of the selected cases, WFP is another fitting case 
to study based on a ‘most similar design’ approach. Both FAO and WFP have a 
mission to fight hunger, both are based in Rome and both are interconnected 
through operational cooperation and governing procedures.13 Another important 
factor for selecting WFP is that it is the world's largest humanitarian agency 
fighting hunger.14  
                                                
10  http://www.globalpolicy.org/un-finance/tables-and-charts-on-un-finance/the-financing-
of-the-un-programmes-funds-and-specialized-agencies.html 
11  http://www.fao.org/about/en/; IFAD Strategic Framework 2011 – 2015, page 5. 
12  Pilon, Juliana, ”The U.N.’s Food and Agricultural Organization: Becoming part of the 
problem.” - The Heritage Foundation no. 626, January 4, 1988; Resignation letter of Louise 
Fresco, ADG, FAO. The Guardian Sunday 14 May 2006. 
13  The Director General of FAO jointly appoints the Executive Director of WFP together 
with the UN Secretary General. 
14  wfp.org 
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The original intention of this thesis was to compare only two similar UN 
organizations with different funding mechanisms. After selecting FAO and WFP 
it came to my attention that organizations in the aid system could also be 
categorized as focused and fragmented organizations (Easterly & Williamson 
2011). The division in focused and fragmented organizations is derived from a 
paper by Easterly and Williamson (2011). Easterly and Williamson measure 
fragmentation with Herfindahl coefficients that are used in industrial organization 
as a measure of market concentration where 1 implies maximum concentration, 0 
implies maximum fragmentation (2011:1935). Specialization captures the extent 
to which aid is divided among many donors, many countries, and in our case, 
many sectors (Easterly & Williamson 2011:1930). In some cases, agencies are 
specialized to a certain sector due to their design and mission. The World Food 
Programme is an agency that has 75% of its aid categorized as food aid, reaching 
a 98% of specialization in the Easterly & Williamson ranking of agency 
performance. FAO is unfortunately not included in the research of Easterly and 
Williamson. However, policy documents provide a picture of FAO as an “an 
excessively fragmented” organization.15 Based on this division, I think it is 
important to compare FAO with a voluntary funded organization that is similar 
when it comes to operational fragmentation, while remaining with the ambition to 
keep WFP as a case study. Therefore, a third case has been included.   
 
UNICEF has been selected as a third case (and second voluntary funded 
organization). It must be recognized that the choice of UNICEF as one of the case 
studies have not been based on any precise grounds. The selection has been based 
on one of the facts that UNICEF also operates on a broad field of sectors scoring 
59 % in the Easterly & Williamson study (2011:1936). Another justification for 
selecting UNICEF is related to funding. FAO receives about 50 % of its total 
resources as non-core contributions (FAO 2009:3). So does UNICEF. The 
equivalent amount for WFP is 99 % (Yussuf et al. 2007:26). 
 
 
 
 
                                                
15  http://www.fao.org/docrep/x4104e/x4104e05.htm; IEE 2007 
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Sector Herfindahls and amount of aid given (log) by agency, 2008 
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2 Theoretical framework 
In this chapter, the theories that have been used to define institutional change will 
be presented. The chapter begins by giving an overview of the theories derived 
from Rational Choice theory and Institutional theory throughout the 20th century, 
which has heavily focused on institutional behavior, structures and agency.16It 
continues with a discussion on institutional change and how Rational Choice 
institutionalists takes individuals preferences and beliefs as causes for engaging in 
change, while new institutionalists argue that the individual's preferences are 
shaped by institutions.17 
2.1 Rational choice theory and institutionalism 
The chosen theoretical approach in this paper is based on the ontological position 
that organizational action is bound to the beliefs and preferences of its members. 
This is true for all types of organizational constellations (or institutions). No 
matter what happens out in the “real world”, the initiation, trajectory and change 
of individuals as central actors determine an institution. This does not prevent to 
take a subjectivist epistemological view. As an observer, I am not unaffected by 
the same challenges experienced by the selected cases (climate change, financial 
crises). Objectivity is not possible because as an observer I share the same social 
constructions of 'reality'. The action and response of the selected cases are guided 
by the values of the actors within the aid system. Their interpretations are the 
interpreted by the observers. Marsh and Furlong calls this 'the double 
hermeneutic' (Marsh & Furlong 2002:19). 
 
Rational choice tells us that individuals engage in cooperation with one and other 
to solve collective action problems. In other words: “to maximize gains from 
                                                
16  See Peters 1998 
17  See Lowndes 2002 
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cooperation” (Lowndes 2002:105). Rational Choice theory is a theory described 
as “individuals as central actors in the political processes and that those 
individuals act rationally to maximize personal utility” (Peters 1999:46). A way to 
look at institutional change is according to Rational Choice theory to focus on the 
individuals as 'appropriate units of analysis' (Peters 1998:122). Political 
phenomena can be explained by individual's values or individual rational 
calculations (Ibid). 
 
Institutionalism, on the other hand, argues that organizations and institutions 
shape the behavior of individuals (Ibid). Institutionalism was up until the 1950s 
the study of constitutions, legal systems and government structures and their 
comparison over time and across countries (Lowndes 2002:91). This was the 
dominant study object among political scientists. The main elements of traditional 
institutional analysis covered the rules, procedures and formal organizations of 
government (Lowndes 2002:92). This theoretical approach was criticized for not 
being specific in its assumptions and practices (Lowndes 2002:90). Moreover, it 
was unreflective on issues regarding theory and method and took 'facts' and values 
for granted (Lowndes 1996:181).   
 
A revised form of institutionalism starting during the 1960s asked questions such 
as 'what constitutes an institution?' and about the way institutions 'do their work' 
and “about the capacity of individual actors to influence the shape and functioning 
of relatively autonomous political institutions”. This thesis concentrates its 
theoretical focus on the features of the new institutionalism and its strains 
(Lowndes 2002:94).  
2.1.1 New Institutional theory 
Critics of the traditional institutional approach pointed out the lack of reflection 
regarding theory and methods and how facts and values were taking for granted. 
The 'old' institutionalism held a very limited scope to its subject matter when 
focusing only on formal rules and organizations from a normative (good 
government), structuralist (structures determine political behavior), historicist (the 
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central influence of history) and holistic (concerned with describing and 
comparing whole systems of government) point of view (Lowndes 2002:94).  
 
The term 'new institutionalism” was coined by March and Olsen in 198418 in a 
seminal paper where they prompted to expand the understanding of institutions by 
asking questions such as “what constitutes an institution?” and “how do they do 
their work”. March and Olsen argued that institutions acts rational and are 
governed by what they called a 'logic of appropriateness'. This being what defines 
what the institution and its members should and should not do (Peters 1998:121) 
This logic is transmitted to their members and which those members use to 
structure their own behavior. Unlike its predecessor, new institutionalists would 
study the culture and values held by the participants in the governing process. 
This was a move from the study of government to the study of governance and 
from a formal to an informal conception of institutions (Lowndes 2003:97; Peters 
1998:122). 
 
Another critic towards the 'old institutionalism' was that it had little agreement on 
what institutions are and much less how it interacts with individuals to produce 
decisions (Peters 1999:vi). March and Olsen argues that institutions are: 
 
“Collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations 
between roles and situations. The process involves determining what the situation is, what role is 
being fulfilled and what obligation of that role in that situation is.”19   
 
Still, new institutionalists define institutions as a 'stable, recurring pattern of 
behavior' (Ibid). New institutionalism admits that despite institutions consists of a 
stable pattern of behavior it is not without the sense that it is unchangeable, 
dysfunctional, or even enforceable (Peters 1999:30). So, what makes institutions 
change? 
 
Organizational change is not a uniform process or one broad institutional response 
to challenges. Change and adaptation is more apparently a piecemeal process of 
                                                
18  March, J. and Olsen, J. (1984) 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in     
Political Life', American Political Science Review, 78: 734-49 
19  Peters 1999:28 
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adjustment (Clay 2003:697). Peters talks about 'the garbage can approach', that is, 
a set of routinized responses to problems stored by institutions. These familiar sets 
of solutions will be primary used before searching for alternatives that are further 
away from core values (Peters 1999:33). An example of this within our context is 
how FAO before engaging in a reform process of its financial framework in 2009 
borrowed increasingly large amounts of money for a few months each year to 
meet its financial obligations (FAO 2007:330). One reason for the cautious 
approach to new problems is what many scholars refer to as change rarely being a 
planned event.20 Rather, steps towards change are the sum of several streams of 
activity ”and opportunities for action within the institution” (Peters 1999:33). 
New institutionalists are on the same pace when explaining change as a process of 
identify and adapting to changing circumstances in their environment through a 
process of learning (Ibid). 
 
The merit of new institutionalism is described by Lowndes as a more expansive 
definition of its subject matter and with a more explicit theoretical framework 
(2002:91). Although very diverse, new institutionalism offers a broad theoretical 
strain to explain change among institutions. Peters presents seven in his book 
Institutional Theory in Political Science: The 'New Institutionalism'.   
 
The Rational Choice strain of new institutionalism tells us that institutions are 
human constructions, designed to solve collective action problems and that they 
can only be 'undone' when they no longer serve actors interests (Lowndes 
2002:105). Peters says that actors “will only change institutions where the likely 
benefits outweigh the expected cost of change itself – including the costs of 
learning how to operate within a new structure, of dealing with new sources of 
uncertainty, and of engaging in change itself” (Ibid). Is the current situation of UN 
Specialized Agencies and Funds/Programs with declining funds, earmarked 
contributions, demands from donors for higher aid efficiency incentives for actors 
within these organizations to push for an institutional change if it means attracting 
more funds and better outcomes?    
 
                                                
20  Clay 2003, Peters 1998,1999 
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Another explanation on when change occurs is “dramatic moments of punctuated 
equilibrium in which new ideas become embodied in institutional form” (Ibid). 
The term 'punctuated equilibrium' could in our case be captured by how donors 
allocate less due to financial strains forcing UN development agencies to embody 
new ideas into institutional form.  
  14 
3 Methodology and Material 
Having discussed the drives behind institutional change in the previous section, 
the research design and methodology utilized to answer the research questions 
will be presented.   
3.1 Method  
The study is carried out as a comparative analysis of UN agencies of which two 
being voluntary funded and one funded through a mixture of assessments and 
voluntary contributions. The type of comparison chosen for this thesis is taken 
from George and Bennett's method of the structured, focused comparison 
(2005:67). This method involves the use of questions that reflect the research 
objective. George and Bennet: 
 
“[...] and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and 
standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and 
cumulation of the findings of the cases possible.” (Ibid) 
 
The questions that will be applied to all three cases are within the scope of what 
Clay says is evidence of institutional change. Below, three different definitions of 
organizational action and steps towards change are presented. 
 
Reformulation  
An organization can declare changes and new directions in terms of policy 
objectives and targets. Doornbos (2000) warns that these kinds of statements 
could be of a purely rhetorical character. This is mostly common among UN-
sponsored international conferences and declarations (ex. The Marrakesh Accord). 
This type of response is according to Clay and Stokke a tactic to avoid “more 
substantive change in actions and mandates” (2000:287). A reformulation or 
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restatement of objectives defines the organization problems and sets the targets 
but is diffuse when it comes to responsibility (Ibid). 
 
Adaptation 
The second type of response is adaption. This type is characterized more in 
“response to short-term influences than as part of a longer-term strategy” (Clay & 
Stokke 2000:382). The institution can present evidence that it has changed its 
modalities and practices. This process of adaptation to deal with problems as they 
arise takes often place in already existing mechanisms. This response increases 
the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian aid and assistance (Ibid:383). But 
this method is, according to Clay and Stokke slowly and with apparent limits to 
change and does not respond well to major changes in the political and economic 
environment (Ibid). 
 
Reconstruction  
Reconstruction is the more ambitious reconfiguring of institutions and mandates. 
This radical institutional reform is perceived by Clay and Stokke as something 
“unrealistic to expect” (Ibid). The best thing to hope is an adaptation, beyond 
rhetoric, to the new realities and challenges. A necessary pressure for change and 
reformation must come from aid recipient countries and major donor countries. 
Some examples of reconstruction can be fund in the funding dynamics, resource 
mobilization strategies and changes in program delivery.  
 
What gives strength to the choice of the structured, focused comparison is how 
George and Bennett argue that the research objective and research strategy to 
achieve that objective should guide the selection and analysis of the cases 
(2005:69). Based on the discussion in the introduction and in the section on cases, 
it is my hope that the reader sees that the cases have not been selected at random. 
Further on, the structure-focused comparison uses variables of theoretical interest 
for purposes of explanation. All the three cases in this thesis possess explanatory 
variables, namely their funding mechanism. 
3.2 Material 
  16 
The core empirical material used in this comparative analysis has been annual 
reports, drafts decisions for board approval and external evaluations. These types 
of empirical material is common to find at the selected cases’ own webpages, 
usually in the form of annual reports and financial statements for a year.  
 
In the case of WFP and UNICEF, their annual reports have been utilized in first 
hand to see the contributions received by funding type and donor. FAO does not 
give out this type of annual reports. Therefore, I had to turn to their Medium Term 
Strategic Plan from 2000 until 2011 to find out the budget proposals for the same 
period.  
 
To verify the selected cases possible declarations of reformulation, or any other 
policy change relevant to fit with the research objective so have publications 
issued by the organizations themselves been used be. Usually, documents like 
strategic plans and programs of work and budgets. The evaluation series of 
multilateral agencies conducted by The Multilateral Organisation Performance 
Assessment Network (MOPAN) has been of great help.  
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4 Analysis 
This chapter starts with a brief background to provide the reader with an overview 
of the external constraints FAO, UNICEF and WFP has experienced since the 
beginning of the year 2000. It will mainly be about the conditions that have 
influenced donors in their ability and preference in allocating contributions.  
 
Further in the chapter, the analysis of the cases is presented. The cases are dealt 
with separately. The structure of the analysis is as such that the case specific 
section starts with a brief presentation of the organization in question. Then, a 
funding overview of the organization for the period 2000-2011 is listed in order to 
see if the received contributions are on par with each other and with the overall 
Official Development Assistance. This is to find out if the patterns over time in 
the form of contributions received are consistent between the organizations, and 
with the DAC's members allocation. If so, more validity is given to the theoretical 
framework of this thesis arguing that institutions acts rational and are governed by 
what they call a 'logic of appropriateness'. And since, as already discussed in the 
introduction, the nature of contributions has changed while the recent financial 
crises have constrained donor's contribution ability. Have the selected cases been 
forced to act rational and engage in institutional change?     
 
Finally, identifying signs of reformulation, adaptation and reconstruction, as per 
the research design, will analyze the actions and responses of the selected cases.   
4.1 Financial crises and donor performance 
By the end of 2007, a new type of emergency had emerged. Unlike crisis with 
familiar cycles such as natural disasters, rising food and fuel prices were not the 
result of a single cause. Between 2006 and mid-2008 world market prices of 
cereals, oil seeds, and dairy products more than doubled (Kappel et al. 2009:3). 
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This has been explained by many factors. One reason can be deduced from the 
fact that annual surpluses in the global cereal production started to become lower 
than or just equal than the consumption in the decades after 1998. This lead to 
declining inventories and soaring prices (Ibid:4). By 2007, the inventories had 
fallen to the lowest reserve ratio of the past 50 years (Ibid). Another factor adding 
explanation to soaring food prices is how the growing per capita income in the 
developing world and higher food utilization added more pressure to the food 
markets. Kappel et al develops this changing pattern in food consumption:  
 
“In addition the food consumption patterns of an emerging global “middle class” changed towards 
diets that are richer in meat and dairy products. The calorie intake from these foodstuffs is much 
more intensive in terms of both grain (fivefold) and water use (tenfold) than from a diet based on 
cereals (e. g. Evans 2008; FAO 2003). Hence, over the last decade dietary changes contributed 
substantially not only to a growing demand for grains, but also to an increasing demand and 
scarcity of water, which may have limited the growth of cereal production in some world 
regions.”21  
 
Von Braun mentions in an IFPRI report from 2008 rising energy prices and 
subsidized biofuel production as other contributions to surging consumption of 
agricultural products (von Braun 2008:1-2). 
 
Alongside the food and fuel crisis the world economy was hit by a financial crisis 
during the second half of 2008 caused by, according to von Braun “flawed 
regulatory regimes and subprime mortgage lending” (Ibid).  
 
The financial crisis took place during a decade where world leaders had 
committed to emphasize harder on international development and increasing aid 
contributions to the poorest countries.  The trends shown in Figure 1 tell us that 
while contributions have increased, the character of the contributions has changed.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
21 Kappel et al 2009:6 
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Source: OECD 3 April 2013 
 
 
The funding for multilateral assistance is basically unchanged throughout the 
period 2000-2012 while bilateral contributions has almost doubled. The multi- 
and bilateral components also follow some similar movements. A steady rise in 
contributions up until 2007, probably as a result of the calls for increased donor 
contributions during the Millennium Summit of September 2000 and the Paris 
Declaration in 2005. Thereafter, increments in contributions can be attributed to 
donor’s response to the high fuel and food prices. From the year 2010 to present, 
contributions starts to drop, although on a lesser scale in the bilateral 
contributions. According to OECD, the continuing financial crisis and euro zone 
turmoil has led several governments to tighten their budgets, which has had a 
direct impact on development aid.22    
4.2 World Food Programme  
                                                
22http://www.oecd.org/development/stats/aidtopoorcountriesslipsfurtherasgovernmentstightenbud
gets.htm accessed 4 may 2013 
Figure 1: COMPONENTS OF DAC DONORS’ OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
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WFP is today the world's largest humanitarian agency fighting hunger. It is both a 
humanitarian and development UN agency (Kliest & Singh 2012:5). Established 
in 1961 by the General Assembly on a 3-year experimental basis under FAO to 
channel US surplus crop as multilateral food aid.23  WFP is governed by the WFP 
Executive Board, which consists of 36 Member States on a rotational basis. An 
Executive Director, who is appointed jointly by the UN Secretary General and the 
Director-General of FAO, heads the organization.24  
 
In the beginning of the new millennium WFP assisted 83 million hungry people in 
83 countries and provided an amount of 3,7 million tons of food. The latest 
available annual report (2011) shows that 3,6 million tons of food was distributed 
to 99 million people in 75 countries. During the same period donor contributions 
has almost doubled.  
 
During the investigated time period, WFP has been hit hard by a triode consisting 
of increased prices for food, fuel and financial crises. These problems and 
challenges are qualified as good incentives for innovation further away from core 
values and familiar set of solutions. If we don't pay a big amount of attention to 
data objectivity and rely entirely on reports and other publications issued by WFP 
itself, we find an organization that claims to have undergone major reforms. With 
the Strategic Plan 2008-2013 WFP lays out a strategy to transform the agency 
from a food aid organization to a food assistance. With a new set of “tools” to 
fight hunger WFP terms this change a 'Revolution'. At least, this is the title of a 
WFP publication from 2009.25 
4.2.1 Funding overview WFP 
WFP is a voluntary funded program of the United Nations. WFP's funding comes 
from governments, private sector and individuals. Donations to WFP are in the 
form of cash, food and items (kitchen utensils, agricultural tools, warehouses).  
 
                                                
23  wfp.org/about 
24  Ibid 
25  Omemo et al 2009, 'Revoultion – From Food Aid to Food Assistance. Innovations in 
overcoming hunger' 
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Contributions to WFP are divided into two categories, directed multilateral and 
multilateral. Directed multilateral are contributions for a specific program 
category and/or country earmarked by donors. Multilateral contributions are 
flexible donations to be spending as per WFP priorities. The vast bulk of 
contributions to WFP are in the form of directed multilateral (99% in 2005) 
Yussuf et al. 2007:26). 
 
The table below shows the amount of food in metric tons delivered, amount of 
beneficiaries, operational expenditures and contributions received between the 
years 2000 and 2011.  
 
Table 1  
Contributions to WFP are divided into two categories,  directed multilateral  and 
multilateral. Directed  multilateral  are  contributions  for  a  specific  program 
category  and/or  country  earmarked  by  donors.  Multilateral  contributions  are 
flexible  donations  to  be  spend  as  per  FP  ri rities.  e  ast  bulk  of 
contributions t   are in the form of directed multilateral (99% in 2005).78
The table below shows the amount of food in metric tons delivered, amount of 
beneficiaries,  operational  expenditures  and  contributions  received  between  the 
years 2000 and 2011. 
Table 1 
What can be confirmed from the above table is the trend of increased financial 
support  from  donors  over  the  last  15  years  for  UN  development 
cooperation.79WFP is no exception. Starting our analysis in 2000, same year the 
MDGs were signed alongside a call for aid increases, donors responded to this 
call. A stable and secure inflow of contributions can be seen between the years 
2000 and 2007 and then taking a leap in the following year 2008. The augmented 
amount of contributions in 2008 is a direct response to the special appeal for $755 
million to  cover  the additional  costs  generated by higher  commodity and fuel 
78 Yussuf et al 2007:26
79 Mahn 2012:1
1
Year Food (mt) distributed* Beneficiaries*
2000 3,7 million 83 million 1599 1569
2001 4,2 million 77 million 1591 1772
2002 3,7 million 72 million 1690 1624
2003 6 million 104.2 million 3392 2306
2004 5,1 million 113 million 3073 2023
2005 4,2 million 96,7 million 3001 2468
2006 4 million 87,8 million 2876 2165
2007 3,3 million 86,1 million 2966 2705
2008 3,9 million 102,1 million 3694 4312
2009 4,6 million 101,8 million 4228 3356
2010 4,6 million 109,2 million 4238 3181
2011 3,6 million 99,1 million 4017 3122
*Source: WFP annual reports
Operational expenditure (US$ Mil.)** Contributions (US$ Mil.)***
**Souce: http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/WFP_Income_and_Expenditure.pdf
***Source: http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/WFP__Top_10_donors_1974_-_2011.pdf  
 
hat can be confirmed from the above table is the trend of increased financial 
support from donors over the last 15 years for UN development cooperatio  
(Mahn 2012:1). WFP is no exception. Starting our analysis  year the 
MDGs were signed alongside a cal  for aid increases, donors responded to this 
cal . A stable and secure inflow of contributions can be seen betwe n the years 
2000 and 2007 and then taking a leap in the fol owing year 2008. The augmented 
amount of contributions in 2008 is a direct response to the special appeal for $755 
mil ion to cover the additional costs generated by higher commodity and fuel 
prices. Donors responded generously with a total amount of 1032 billion USD 
  22 
(WFP 2009a:4). The sharp decline in contributions in 2009 can be seen as a 
normalization of the contribution level. A downward trend starts in the year after.   
 
Statistics from OECD on resource flows to developing countries26 shows that 
contributions from DAC and non-DAC countries to multilateral organizations 
follow a similar path. Figure 1. confirms the second overall trend in foreign aid 
funding in the past 15 years, that it is most inclined to provide grants for specific 
locations and issues.27 In 2011, bilateral contributions consisted of nearly two 
thirds of the entire Official Development Assistance.  
4.2.2 Sign of Reformulation  
The General Assembly and the Food and Agricultural Organization jointly 
established WFP in 1961. Its original mandate was to deliver and distribute 
surplus food from rich Northern countries to poor and hungry populations in the 
South. Food aid today has become more budget-driven and less surplus- driven 
(Christensen 2000:257). This, alongside a decline in the “popularity” of food as 
aid, has forced food aid actors to rethink their actions and policies. “Food policy” 
has previously during the 1980s undergone changes. More focus on food security 
also developed towards a discourse on to include both supply and access 
(Maxwell & Slater 2003:532). Amartya Sen is usually credited with shifting the 
discourse towards entitlement and access.28    
 
New drivers during the new millennium such as globalization and climate change 
combined with older ones, such as civil strife, inequality and weak governance 
forced WFP and its policy makers to some reformulation and restatement of 
objectives. Most clearly are these to be found in the WFP Strategic Plan 2008-
2013. The 2008-2013 objectives are similar to the ones in the previous strategic 
plans. Restatement of objectives is to be found in the aim of the Strategic Plan, 
which is to “support nations in meeting emergency needs and in identifying 
                                                
26 http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/statisticsonresourceflowstodevelopingcountries.htm accessed 
2nd may 2013 
27 See Mahn 2012 
28 See Sen, A. K. (1981) Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation.  
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longer-term solutions to the hunger challenge” (WFP 2009a:3). This overall aim is 
in accordance with declaration 3, sector ii of the Paris declaration:  
 
“Increasing alignment of aid with partner countries’ priorities, systems and procedures and helping 
to strengthen their capacities”.  
 
Another clear sign of reformulation and restatement is to be found in the preface 
of the 2008 WFP annual report by the Executive Director: 
 
“We were able to draw on the five Strategic Objectives of the Plan, framed around WFP’s mission 
and mandate, to reposition WFP from a food aid agency to a food assistance agency.” (Ibid) 
 
The statement repositioning the world’s largest humanitarian agency fighting 
hunger from a food aid agency to a food assistance must be interpreted as an 
innovative move. WFPs mandate to “avert starvation in humanitarian crises 
through food assistance, delivered not only within emergency operations that fill 
food gaps in the short term, but also within programs that promote long-term 
development and thereby break the deeply rooted hunger-poverty cycle” is 
through the new plan implemented by interventions that should be provided in 
ways that meet hunger needs, strengthen local markets, foster small farmers’ 
productivity, and build national capacities (Omamo et al. 2010:3). The ground 
idea of reformulation by WFP is not only to be perceived as an organization that 
delivers food, but also as an organization that delivers hunger solutions. This shift 
in directions of policy objectives and targets is presented by WFP themselves as a 
historical shift. Not longer instrument-based, but problem-based (Ibid). 
 
 
 
Table 2 Strategic plans 
Strategic plan 2004-2007 Strategic Priorities  Strategic plan 2008-2014 Strategic Objectives  
1. Save Lives in Crisis Situations  1. Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies 
2. Protect Livelihoods in Crisis Situations and 
Enhance Resilience to Shocks  
2. Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster 
preparedness and mitigation measures 
3. Support the Improved Nutrition and Health Status 
of Children, Mothers and Other Vulnerable People  
3. Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-
conflict, post-disaster or transition situations 
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4. Support Access to Education and Reduce Gender 
Disparity in Access to Education and Skills Training  
4. Reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition 
5. Help Governments Establish and Manage National 
Food- Assistance Program  
5. Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce 
hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local 
purchase 
 
4.2.3 Signs of Adaptation 
The theoretical framework's view on adaptation relies on changes in an 
organizations modalities and practices. In the case of WFP they emphasize the 
need for adaption due to the global context in which WFP operates as rapidly 
changing.29The Strategic Plan mentions recent market shocks and the challenges 
presented by climate change as incentives for adaptation. Another one, 
continuously mentioned by Easterly is food aid as an ineffective aid channel. 
Even in the case of disaster relief is food as aid becoming a less important tool 
Easterly & Williamson 2011:1940). WFP delivers 84% of its aid as food (Ibid). 
This should not be interpreted as an astonishing high percentage given the 
mandate of the WFP. It is though worth mentioning that a bigger part of the 
contributions to WFP are in the form of in-kind food and directed contributions 
reducing the flexibility of WFPs program priorities.   
 
New practices and modalities introduced by WFP show clear evidence that they 
focus more on non-food-based assistance. In a WFP publication released in 2010 
on innovations in overcoming hunger, an “expanded set of food assistance tools 
for addressing hunger, and thereby promoting growth and development within a 
rapidly changing global environment” is presented (Omamo et al. 2010:3). The 
primary focus is on vouchers and cash transfers to be provided as alternatives or 
complements to food transfer programs. Most of these programs were 
implemented as a direct response to the high food and fuel prices to stimulate 
local business and farming sectors (Ibid:6).  
 
In 2008 WFP launched a five-year project called Purchase for Progress (P4P). 
Focus is on supporting smallholder/low income farmers by bringing them closer 
                                                
29 WFP Strategic Plan 2008 – 2013  
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to agricultural markets.  Through P4P, WFP is committed to using a portion – 
averaging 10 percent – of its commodity purchasing power to engage low-income 
farmers in a sustainable program of tendering and selling their crops to WFP 
(Omamo et al. 2010:126).  
4.2.4 Signs of Reconstruction 
A necessary pressure for change and reformation in a humanitarian context must 
come from aid recipient countries and major donor countries.30 There is no data 
available on the impact of aid on the beneficiaries31, which would be the most 
desirable measure of quality of aid and a possible basis for reconstruction 
requirements. However, there are many examples of pressure from donors for the 
need of better aid practices (Paris Declaration 2005 as an example).  
 
As mentioned in the theoretical framework section, some examples of 
reconstruction can be fund in the funding dynamics, resource mobilization 
strategies and changes in program delivery. When it comes to funding 
mechanisms WFP initiated in 2009 a review of it financial framework to improve 
the predictability and stability of it’s funding (Zhang & Chulkov 2009:9). The 
challenge for a voluntary funded agency like WFP is when, on average, donors 
ultimately fund only 80 to 90 per cent of the operations requirements. The donors 
funding capacities has during the last years been undermined due to the financial 
crisis. For this reason and as a direct response to Board requests for greater 
strategic focus on prioritization of resources, WFP created the Strategic Resource 
Allocation Committee (SRAC) in May 2009 to oversee the strategic prioritization 
in the allocation of all resources, maintain a strategic overview of all needs and 
shortfalls for WFP operations and to prioritize areas for major appeals and 
fundraising.32  
 
Changes in resource mobilization strategies are to be seen in WFP's effort to 
increase private sector donations. Although it is still marginal amounts compared 
                                                
30 See Clay 2003 
31 See Easterly & Williamson 2011:1930 
32 WFP 2009b, paragraph 12  
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to government contributions, private sector donations increased from 7 million 
USD in 2007 to about 150 million USD in 2010. The proportion fell sharply 
thereafter but is on an average 55 million USD/year.33  
 
Regarding changes in program deliveries, it is important to ask how the 
decreasing role of food as aid has affected WFP's program deliveries? Table 3 
confirms this phenomenon as total quantities channeled bilaterally, multilaterally 
or through NGOs (Project) or bilaterally on a government-to-government basis 
(Programme)34 since the year 2000 has continuously dropped. According to 
Maxwell, this has inevitably led to declining food aid resources for development, 
and a greater concentration of these resources in fewer countries (2007:29).  
 
The introduction of vouchers in 2008 demonstrates changes in the way WFP 
nowadays delivers food assistance. Vouchers can be utilized in selected shops 
with groceries locally produced. Cash transfers are given to poor, hungry people 
to spend as they wish. According to recent surveys carried out by WFP, 
beneficiaries tend to spend that extra cash on food (WFP 2010:27).  
  
Figure 2. Global food aid deliveries in metric tons 2000 – 2011 
 
                                                
33 My calculation based on data from wfp.org 
34 http://www.wfp.org/fais/quantity-reporting/glossary#P 
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4.3 United Nations Children’s Fund 
 
UNICEF, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, was 
established by the General Assembly in December 1946 as a relief program for 
the millions of displaced and refugee children deprived of shelter, fuel and food in 
the aftermath of World War II. On October 1953, the General Assembly decided 
to continue the organization on a permanent basis, changing its name to the 
United Nations Children’s Fund while retaining the acronym UNICEF (UNICEF 
2013:3). The Executive Board (EB) consisting of 36 members governs UNICEF. 
A President and four Vice-Presidents coordinate the work of the EB. UNICEF’s 
Executive Director administers the work and policies adopted by the EB.35  
 
UNICEF currently has programs and cooperation in some 160 countries 
worldwide staffing about 10,000 people (UNICEF 2013:3). According to the 
Medium Term Strategic Plan 2006-2013 UNICEF will focus on the following 
areas: 
 
1. Child survival and development 
2. Basic education & gender equality 
3. Children and HIV/AIDS 
4. Child protection 
5. Policy advocacy & partnerships 
4.3.1 Funding 
UNICEF is entirely funded by voluntary contributions from Governments and 
donations from the private sector. It also receives donations from 36 National 
Committees, as well as the sale of greeting cards and gifts or other private-sector 
fundraising activities (Ibid). The National Committees cultivate relationships with 
                                                
35  http://www.unicef.org/about/execboard/index.html accessed 6 May 2013 
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key partners in the private sector, volunteers and over 6 million individual donors, 
raising nearly one third of UNICEF’s income (UNICEF 2003:30). 
 
Contributions to UNICEF are divided into two categories, regular resources and 
other resources. Regular resources, UNICEF's bedrock are unrestricted funds 
(UNICEF 2001:22). These funds are used for participation in programs and 
activities approved by the EB as well as for program support and management and 
administration of the organization. Other resources are restricted funds earmarked 
for special purposes (Ibid). 
4.3.2 Funding overview UNICEF 2000 – 2011 
The table below shows contributions given to UNICEF between 2000 and 2011. 
The figures are divided into regular and other resources donated by Governments 
and the Private Sector.36 
 
Table 3 Income UNICEF 2000 - 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
36  Total contributions as per below table does not equal to official UNICEF income per 
year. This is due to that table 3 does not include other incomes such as interest nor costs of goods 
delivered and other expenses (deducted from grand total).  
 
Private Sector Contributions
Regular Other Regular Other Total
2000
2001
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
 All sums in $US 
Governments and 
intergovernmental 
contributions
343 132 447 368 492 257 253 872 855 146 241 603 1 111 739 162
351 085 171 418 457 314 237 969 888 173 751 028 1 181 263 401
403 456 658 732 651 077 365 309 734 223 435 892 1 724 853 361
437 639 195 901 379 779 373 389 589 285 200 064 1 997 608 627
467 579 531 1 003 102 265 383 053 512 947 158 453 2 800 893 761
465 719 523 1 147 737 623 469 943 046 577 086 079 2 660 486 271
537 981 657 1 070 674 220 480 792 739 709 481 782 2 798 930 398
615 731 026 1 679 352 716 428 912 302 401 638 824 3 125 634 868
594 491 624 1 657 501 755 483 083 263 347 099 164 3 082 175 806
575 705 351 1 863 834 573 468 859 456 610 520 259 3 518 919 639
646 390 634 1 921 233 565 486 171 303 711 916 882 3 765 712 384
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The total annual income to UNICEF between 2000 and 2011 has been of an ever-
increasing character. The flow of contributions to UNICEF makes a similar path 
of the one from the DAC countries contributions during the same period.37 
Between 2000 and 2005 there is an ongoing continuous increase to decrease 
slightly in 2006. The sudden increase in contributions between 2004 and 2005, 
which is also notable among DAC donors but also in the case of WFP, has two 
reliable explanations. First one is the agreement on aid increases among world 
leaders in Paris Declaration of 2005; second one is due to the donor response for 
the 2004 South East Asia tsunami emergency. Contributions continue to increase 
up to 2011, even though a marginal decrease is noted between the years 2008 and 
2009.  2009 is also the year Government contributions are lower than the previous 
year for the first time during the selected period of time. UNICEF admits that the 
global economic decline has affected development assistance in general (UNICEF 
2009:38). 
 
Based on the total amount received by UNICEF, it is fair to say that their resource 
mobilization and funding strategies has resulted in plausible amounts. But, 
UNICEF is a clear confirmation of previous studies38 on how the character of the 
increased contributions has changed. Starting in 2000, this is the first time in 
UNICEFs history that regular resources represented less than half of the income 
(49 %) (UNICEF 2000:22). Of the 51 % directed towards other resources, only 33 
% supported projects approved by the Executive Board as extensions of programs 
funded by regular resources (Ibid). The decline in regular resources is regarded in 
the 2000 annual report as a cause of deep concern for the organization (Ibid). 
 
The imbalance between regular (core resources) and other contributions is further 
cemented. In 2003 regular resources constitutes of only 43% primarily due to 
growth in ‘other resources’ emergency contributions (UNICEF 2003:38). In 2005, 
other resources accounts for 71% of the total income. Worth mentioning is that 
Private sector response to the Indian Ocean tsunami and South Asia earthquake 
emergencies resulted in an almost three- fold increase in contributions to other 
                                                
37  See figure 1 
38 See Mahn 2012; Yussuf et al. 2007 
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resources (emergency), from $391 million in 2004 to $1,129 million in 2005 
(UNICEF 2005:31). 
 
A UN Joint Inspection Unit report from 2007 highlights the donor tendency of 
increasing its earmarked contributions to the multilateral UN agencies. The rapid 
increase of other resources to UNICEF is viewed as a tendency for UNICEF to 
become a contractor rather than a partner, and having less influence on assigning 
income to strategic objectives (Yussuf et al. 2007:13). 
 
A well-developed income resource for UNICEF is the private sector. National 
Committees accounts for a considerable amount of the Private Sector 
contributions. The above table shows that the private sector's preference also is 
with contributing to the other resources category rather than core financing. 
 
In the next sections a more in-depth discussion regarding UNICEF capability to 
maintain 'organizational independence' in times of increased conditionalities from 
donors will be presented. The theoretical framework will be compared with 
actions taken by UNICEF to investigate any findings regarding reformulation, 
adaptation and reconstruction.   
4.3.3 Signs of Reformulation or Restatement of objectives 
 
UNICEF is one of the oldest and most known UN agencies. UNICEF is 
recognized for having a clear and well-defined mandate with children and women 
as specific areas of its mandate.39 In several evaluations UNICEF scores high 
ratings in operational, strategic and overall management and performance. In a 
2008 report by Easterly and Pfutze UNICEF ranks the highest among UN 
agencies on best practices in aid (Easterly & Pfutze 2008:49). In another 
evaluation by the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network 
(MOPAN), UNICEF is perceived to “perform strongly on indicators of 
organizational practices and behaviors that have important repercussions at the 
                                                
39 See MOPAN 2010  
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country level: delegation of decision- making, results focus of country 
programming, contributions to policy dialogue.” (MOPAN 2010:27).  
 
Signs of declarations of change and new directions in terms of policy objectives 
and targets can be found in the Mid Term Strategic Plan for 2006 -2009 (extended 
to 2013 in February 2009)40 when it was proposed to organize UNICEF's work 
around five key focus areas, each aimed at contributing to one or more of the 
Millennium goals and commitments.41 The five key areas are: 
 
1. Child survival and development 
2. Basic education & gender equality 
3. Children and HIV/AIDS 
4. Child protection 
5. Policy advocacy & partnerships 
 
The organizational priorities of UNICEF stated in the previous MTSP (2002-
2006) are similar to the ones presented above, although differently formulated: 
 
1. girls’ education 
2. integrated early childhood development 
3. immunization “plus” 
4. fighting HIV/AIDS 
5. improved protection of children from violence, exploitation, abuse and 
discrimination 
Source: UNICEF EB 2nd Regular Session 2001, 31 May 2001 
 
The context of the new strategic plan is designed based on the prevailing 
conditions children facing but also for UNICEF as an organization. Chapter 2 of 
the MTSP 2006 – 2009 draft42 lays out changes in the global and organizational 
contexts taken into consideration in the new MTSP. A series of facts presented 
tells of child poverty, child mortality increasing in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, 
                                                
40  UNICEF 2011:4 
41  Ibid:5 
42 See E/ICEF/2005/7.  
  32 
malnutrition as a constant risk factor for children. As a strategic corporate 
response, following is listed in the MTSP 2006-201343:  
 
1. Increased emphasis on disaster risk reduction, effective humanitarian response 
and preparedness;  
2. More effective use of communication for development to promote positive 
behavioral practices in support of child outcomes;  
3. Greater focus on children in poor, climate-insecure and underserved urban areas;  
4. Leveraging of new opportunities for adolescents and young people, including 
through information technology;  
5. Promoting and engaging in policy dialogue in support of national planning and 
monitoring, through evidence- based advocacy.  
 
A sign of reformulation according to the theoretical framework is to identify the 
organizations problems and setting the target. The challenges listed in UNICEF's 
MTSP are certainly of great concern and the way forward suggested in the plan 
matches the need and priorities to overcome the constraints in the external 
environment. However, neither new directions nor changes at the corporate level 
are declared over the investigated period.  
  
UNICEF is a multilateral aid and emergency agency with a clear mandate. That is, 
to “advocate for the protection of children’s rights, meet their basic needs, and 
expand their opportunities to reach their full potential.” (MOPAN 2010:7). This 
is, from a donor point of view, an important aid actor to support and UNICEF 
enjoys positive relationships with government partners. It is regarded to be 
efficient and to get things done on the ground. In other words, this is an 
organization that has not had its work and methods questioned and therefore one 
could say that a need for change and new directions has not been necessary.  
 
4.3.4 Signs of Adaptation 
                                                
43 UNICEF 2011 
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An organization can show signs of adaptation by present evidence that it has 
changed its modalities and practices. UNICEF has been focusing on increases in 
effectiveness and efficiency. In 2005, the UNICEF Executive Director 
commissioned a Global Organisational Review to provide guidance for 
organizational improvement (MOPAN 2010:8). In 2011, UNICEF began to roll 
out an organization-wide implementation of the new Monitoring of Results for 
Equity Systems. This is to monitor and manage program expenditures against 
program results (UNICEF 2011a:2). This work is closely related to the ongoing 
UN reform work lead by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG).  As 
part of the Chief Executives Board (CEB), which role is to promote further 
coordination and cooperation on a whole range of substantive and management 
issues facing the United Nations system, UNICEF actively participates in a 
number of harmonization efforts and as a leader in promoting United Nations 
coherence at all levels.44  
 
This process of adaptation to deal with requirements to improve the effectiveness 
of UN development operations and to cope with the declarations on efficiency in 
the Paris Declaration are taking place in already existing mechanisms of UNICEF. 
These method are, according to Clay and Stokke (2000), slowly and with apparent 
limits to change and does not respond well to major changes in the political and 
economic environment. This paper does not aim to evaluate the initiatives taken 
by UNICEF and any possible outcomes. However, regarding adaptation as a less 
ambitious method of reconfiguring an institution, and as a response to short-term 
influences, the improvements undertaken by UNICEF in a spirit of Result Based 
Management have not been declared as change in formal statements of policy. 
Rather, the organizational improvements can almost be regarded as expected 
actions taken by a leading actor of the UN-reform process.   
4.3.5 Signs of Reconstruction  
Institutional reform is perceived by Clay and Stokke (2000) as something 
unrealistic to expect. Pressure for change and reformation must come from aid 
recipient countries and major aid donors. The case of UNICEF is, apart from 
                                                
44 MOPAN 2010:9; http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=591 
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being fragmented, also considered as highly decentralized. UNICEFs 
decentralized operation is considered to be a key strength by donor and partners at 
both headquarters and country level (MOPAN 2010:7). The fragmented work of 
UNICEF, i.e. dividing its main areas of work in five focus areas, gives UNICEF a 
position to handle challenges and problems in one of the focus areas separately. 
The framework provided in the MTSP is very focused in country specific national 
priorities considering UNICEF past experience regarding country and regional 
conditions.45 To push through a major reform would be for such a large and 
decentralized organization like UNICEF a difficult and resource intensive 
operation. However, greater demands from Donors or country partners on major 
reforms have not been found. Once again it must be referred to the positive results 
UNICEF have had in various evaluations regarding performance and mandate.  
  
A concern for UNICEF that is stated in the annual reports is the decreasing 
contributions to its core activities. In the annual report from 2002 UNICEF argues 
“only from the position of a strong and effective core program base can UNICEF 
effectively implement additional ‘other resource’ contributions from 
governmental and private sector donors.” (UNICEF 2002:38). The preference of 
donors to contribute more to specific areas and issues can be perceived as a kind 
of donor pressure and reason for reconstruction.  
 
The analytical framework list as examples of reconstruction change in the funding 
dynamics, resource mobilization strategies and changes in program delivery. If we 
look at UNICEFs funding and resource strategies, changes were made in 2003 to 
cope with the augmented contributions to 'other resources'.  UNICEF formally 
introduced a new category of other resources: the thematic contribution. These 
contributions from donors are according to the UNICEF annual report to support 
the achievement of results in specific thematic areas that relate to the 
organizational priorities. For 2003, thematic contributions amounted to $29.6 
million (UNICEF 2003:38). In 2011, resources channeled through six thematic 
funds fell by 23 per cent, from $241 million in 2010 to $187 million in 2011 
(UNICEF 2011:31). Yussuf et al.  acknowledges that donor earmarking can lead 
                                                
45 Ibid 
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to the distortion of program priorities. The introduction of thematic funds by 
UNICEF is seen as a best practice alongside pooled funds (Yussuf et al. 2007:iii). 
 
Further innovations within resource mobilization came with a new strategy 
developed in 2006 to align with the current orientation of the funding environment 
(Yussuf et al 2007:21). The decentralized character of UNICEF and strong 
country presence makes it a good incentive to raise funds at the country level.  
 
There are many findings on what UNICEF has done during the investigated time 
period to strengthen its capacities to achieve results for children. Most noticeably 
is the implementation in the MTSP of 2006 – 2013 to organize UNICEF’s work 
around five focus areas. However, it has not been able to find in official UNICEF 
documents a formal comprehensive strategy at the overall corporate level that 
suggest changes in program delivery. 
4.4 Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) 
The Food and Agricultural Organization is one of the Specialized Agencies of the 
United Nations dealing with agriculture, fisheries, forestry and food Security. 
During the first session of FAO Conference hosted by the United Nations Interim 
Commission on Food and Agriculture, representatives met in Quebec on 16 
October 1945 to sign the Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization.46 
 
The leading mission of FAO is encapsulated in three global goals for: i) the 
reduction of the absolute number of people suffering from hunger; ii) the 
elimination of poverty and the driving forward of economic and social progress 
for all; and iii) the sustainable management and utilization of natural resources for 
the benefit of future generations (MOPAN 2011:2). 
 
The organization concentrates it’s programming in the following core activities: 
 
• Agriculture 
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• Economic and social 
• Fisheries and aquaculture 
• Forestry 
• Natural resources 
• Technical cooperation 
 
The FAO Conference of member governments governs FAO. It comprises all 
Members and Associate Members. FAO has 191 Member Nations plus one 
Member Organization, the European Union and two Associate Members, The 
Faroe Islands and Tokelau.47The Conference meets once per biennium and its 
purpose is to determine the policy and approve the Medium Term Plan (MTP) and 
Programme of Work and Budget of the organization. The FAO Council acts as the 
Conference's executive organ between sessions. 
4.4.1 FAO funding. 
Funding to support the FAO’s program of work derives from assessed 
contributions provided by FAO members, and from voluntary contributions 
provided by members and other FAO partners. The biennial Conference decides 
the level of the FAO’s regular budget and sets the assessed contribution payable 
by the FAO membership (MOPAN 2011:3). 
 
The Voluntary Contributions reflect the estimates for extra-budgetary resources 
and fall into two main categories. The first one is the Core Voluntary 
Contributions that are the estimated extra-budgetary resource requirements 
planned in the Program of Work and managed closely with the net appropriation. 
The second category is the other extra budgetary voluntary contributions. These 
are estimates of voluntary contributions for programs and projects contributing to 
the results frameworks in the Medium Term Plan and providing support to the 
field program and technical assistance to countries (i.e. technical cooperation) and 
emergency and rehabilitation assistance (FAO 2009:27).  
                                                                                                                                                   
46  http://www.fao.org/about/en/ 
47  http://www.fao.org/unfao/govbodies/gsbhome/conference0/en/ 
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4.4.2 Funding overview 
In the case of FAO, it has not been possible to find first-hand material regarding 
the contributions received from members or other sources. Unlike the two 
previous cases, FAO does not publish documentation on its work in the form of 
annual reports. FAO website has thoroughly been scanned for information 
regarding donor contributions. Some material has been found but not enough to 
set up a compilation of contributions received. For comparison, it must be 
mentioned that in the cases with UNICEF and WFP, their respective websites 
were the first point of departure and the navigation of these pages was facilitated 
by clear menus and accessible material. Instead, the figures from FAO’s biannual 
budget (Program of Work and Budget) have been utilized. This budget can be 
found in the Medium Term Plans of FAO which after some effort was found 
among the documentation on the website.48   
 
Table 4 FAO budget proposal 
FAO budget proposal (in USD)
Net Appropriation
Voluntary 
contributions Total
2000-2001 650 000 000 584 930 000 1 234 930 000
2002-2003 685 534 000 637 252 000 1 322 786 000
2004-2005 687 709 000 600 715 000 1 288 424 000
2006-2007 765 700 000 890 347 000 1 656 047 000
2008-2009 784 400 000 962 071 000 1 746 471 000
2010-2011 945 965 000 1 264 941 000 2 210 906 000
 
One source of funding is the assessed contributions by Members (based on the 
agreed scale of contributions) financing the Net Appropriation voted by the 
Conference in the Budgetary Appropriations Resolution. The other main source 
stems from extra-budgetary contributions provided by Members and other 
partners on a voluntary basis through direct support to FAO, or through technical 
                                                
48  See http://www.fao.org/pwb/previous/en/ 
  38 
and emergency (including rehabilitation) assistance to governments for clearly 
defined purposes linked to the MTP (MOPAN 2011:26). 
 
A weakness of utilizing a budget instead of actual income is that we can not 
assess the extent to which the amounts of the budget has been implemented within 
the organization due to lack of documentation. Fortunately, other sources have 
been found that provides more information regarding the funding of FAO. The 
table below, extracted from the Global Policy Forums webpage shows the 
collection of assessed contributions to FAO (all numbers are in %):49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 FAO Actual collection of assessments 2000 - 2011 
 
A similar source for collection of voluntary contributions has not been allocated. 
However, the MOPAN assessment of FAO in 2011 shows that actual delivery of 
voluntary budgetary resources exceeded the forecast delivery between 2006-2007 
and 2008-2009 (MOPAN 2011:3). An observation that can be made is how the 
amounts collected from the 191 Member Nations plus member organization and 
associated members reveals that governmental contributions have not increased. 
Neither seems its members and donors have followed the directives to meet the 
MDGs by increasing aid allocations (and later remarked in 2005 with the Paris 
Declaration), or followed the pattern of the DAC countries' contribution since the 
new millennium. No conclusions can either be made with respect to the financial 
                                                
49http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/images/pdfs/Collection_of_Assessed_Contributions_t
o_UN_Specialized_Agencies.pdf. All biennium figures from FAO Programatic Work and Budget  
are divided into two equal amounts. 
Net Appropriation Collection % Collection USD
2000 95
2001 93
2002 68
2003 49
2004 48
2005 50
2006 40
2007 64
2008 73
2009 71
2010 93
2011 83
Total
325 000 000 308 750 000
325 000 000 302 250 000
342 767 000 233 081 560
342 767 000 167 955 830
343 854 500 165 050 160
343 854 500 171 927 250
382 850 000 153 140 000
382 850 000 245 024 000
392 200 000 286 306 000
392 200 000 278 462 000
472 982 500 439 873 725
472 982 500 392 575 475
4 519 308 000 3 144 396 000
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crisis that started in 2008 based on funding from governments to FAO as these 
have kept a constant level with marginal increase.  
 
FAO, like other multilateral organizations, has been affected by influence of 
donor preferences on program priorities. Yussuf writes as an example in a Joint 
Inspection Unit report: 
 
“The tendency of voluntary contributions to be earmarked, coupled with cumulative cuts in 
allocations under the regular budget over several bienniums, have resulted in a somewhat uneven 
field program, with heavy concentration of work in certain areas, to the detriment of the broad 
range of requirements for assistance from recipient countries in mandated technical areas.”50  
4.4.3 Signs of Reformulation or Restatement of objectives 
While this is an organization that is highly valued for its clear mission and 
mandate, it is striking how independent evaluations and reports ranks FAO as 
week when it comes to organizational behavior, management and strategic 
performance.51 Another report that gives more weight to the criticism of FAO is 
the Report of the Independent External Evaluation (IEE). The FAO Council 
commissioned the evaluation in 2004 and it was the first of its kind in the history 
of the FAO. The IEE shows evidence of an organization that “is today in a 
financial and program crisis that imperils the Organization’s future in delivering 
essential services to the world.” (IEE 2007:3). The challenges within FAO's scope 
of work are reasons to revise its way of doing business. More and more people 
suffer from food insecurity. Production is now growing more slowly as growth in 
demands over the coming decades will place increasing pressure on the natural 
resource base. On top of this there is the global threat of climate change.  
 
The purpose of the IEE evaluation was not only to identify outcomes, impacts and 
institutional performance, but also, as per the Terms of References of the IEE: “to 
chart the way forward (in order to)... make FAO fit for the twenty-first century 
                                                
50  Yussuf et al 2007:13 
51  See AUSAID 2012; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden 2008; MOPAN 2011 
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and the challenges ahead.”52 The IEEs principal conclusion was to engage in a 
'reform with growth'. Based on the recommendations of the IEE, FAO adopted in 
2009 the Immediate Plan for Action (2009-2011) for FAO Renewal (IPA).53  
 
The above recap of what has characterized FAO's organizational activities fits 
well with the theoretical framework's definition of a reformulation or restatement 
of objectives. Problems and challenges have been detected and changes and new 
directions in terms of policy objectives and targets have been presented. This type 
of organizational action is diffuse when it comes to responsibility according to 
Clay and Stokke (2000:287). In the case of FAO and its ongoing reform process, 
this can be challenged on the grounds that a new results-based framework has 
been introduced to support the 2010–13 Medium Term Plan.  
4.4.4 Signs of Adaptation 
FAO is recognized for having a clear mandate and a strategy that links to that 
mandate (MOPAN 2011:vii). FAO possesses its greatest strength in its role as a 
knowledge-driven agency. Its strengths lies in its normative work in the field of 
CODEX and Phytosanitry standards and furthermore in fisheries, being the only 
real international body dealing with it and forestry (Ibid:3). As stated by the IEE 
regarding the importance of FAO: 
 
“The evaluation found that while FAO continues to provide a range of essential goods and services 
that no other organization can adequately provide, these areas are today at serious risk. If FAO 
were to disappear tomorrow, much of it would need to be re-invented but with much more precise 
priorities and a concentration of its efforts in areas of demonstrable need which correspond to its 
comparative advantage.” (IEE 2009:3).  
 
de Haen et al (2003) writes in an article about the fundamental changes in the 
world food economy and how these pose new challenges for all participants in the 
food system (de Haen et al. 2003:683). The article concentrates on FAO and asks: 
“How does FAO ensure that new issues do not distract attention from the 
                                                
52  Report to the Council of the Inter-Sessional Working Group for the Independent 
External Evaluation of FAO (IEE), CL 129/10.  
53  FAO 35th Special Session, Rome 18 – 22 November 2008 – Draft resolution 1/2008  
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fundamental objective of reducing undernourishment and poverty? And are there 
opportunities for FAO to develop innovative ways of thinking about and 
responding to food insecurity?”(Ibid). 
 
When setting the above questions in relation to the findings in the IEE evaluation, 
one can say that FAO has not responded to the challenges it faces. In the report it 
says that FAO “has been conservative and slow to adapt, slow to distinguish areas 
of genuine priority from those which are the latest fad.” (IEE 2009:3). There is 
undoubtedly a need for adaptation.  
 
The purpose of engaging in the process of adaptation is that it increases the 
effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian aid and assistance. The IEE 
evaluation makes over one hundred recommendations aiming at reforming the 
organization to better handle the new challenges in food and agriculture. FAO has 
with the commission of the IEE taken it first steps towards adaptation. Since the 
final evaluation and the development of the IPA in 2009, FAO have had several 
years to show that it has changed its modalities and practices. 
 
As mentioned in section 4.5.3, so has FAO introduced a Results-Based framework 
for all FAO’s work. FAO did use a result based management framework before 
but the results of their programmatic work were more evaluated by outcomes than 
impact.54 This meant that FAO had focused more on developing projects than the 
expected effects of these.55 
 
To address the trend of increased voluntary funding, FAO introduced the concept 
of Impact Focus Areas (IFAs). IFAs are priorities identified by members (donors) 
and by the rest of the organization where additional resources for capacity 
development and policy support can significantly improve the impact and 
sustainability of FAO’s work. The idea is to target voluntary contributions 
towards highly prioritized areas (FAO 2008:9). 
 
                                                
54  See Utrikesdepartamentet 2008 
55  Ibid 
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A characteristic of adaptation is that it often takes place in already existing 
mechanisms. All the proposals in the IEE and the IPA has not been examined, so 
it is not possible to draw a conclusion on whether the measures to adapt FAO to 
the challenges of today has taken place in already existing mechanisms or if it has 
a character of introducing new modalities. The proposals that have been 
investigated because it was considered to have special importance to this paper are 
in the areas of organizational results and governance. Measures to streamline 
these areas have been made in the existing mechanisms. For organizational 
results, a new RBM-framework was proposed. In the case of governance, the IPA 
proposes that the structure of the governing bodies remains the same but adding a 
series of measures to make the Conference more action orientated and the Council 
will be further developed with attention to making clear decisions.56  
4.4.5 Signs of Reconstruction 
Reconstruction is explained by Clay and Stokke as the most ambitious type of 
organizational reform and as unrealistic to expect (Clay & Stokke, 2000:383). 
Organizations can engage in declaring changes and new directions (reformulation) 
and present change in its modalities and practices (adaptation). These types of 
reform are common among UN agencies as responses of a purely rhetorical 
character and as “responses to short-term influences than as part of a longer-term 
strategy” (Ibid:382). The fact is that FAO is undergoing one of the most 
comprehensive reform programs in the UN system (AUSAID 2012:2). The results 
are yet to be evaluated but the evidence of a process of reformulation and 
adaptation are concrete.57  
 
Incentives for change are often in the form of external pressure. For aid agencies 
this pressure might come from donors as well as from aid recipients (Clay & 
Stokke, 2000:383). Since the beginning of the new millennium, donors have been 
pushing management to make a set of clearly needed reforms (AUSAID 2012:12). 
A critic for a long time has been regarding resource mobilization and how no 
formal comprehensive strategy at the overall corporate level has been available 
                                                
56  See FAO 2008, section B ”Governance Reform”. 
57  The Immediate Plan of Action for FAO Renewal is a good example. 
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(Yussuf et al 2007:32). FAO mandate extends over a broad spectrum and so have 
the programs implemented by FAO at a global and regional level which according 
to an AUSAID evaluation “in number and content to be out of proportion to the 
resources likely to be available for the organisation to pursue them.” (AUSAID 
2012:11). FAO undertook in the IPA to develop a clearer resource allocation 
mechanism and to start treating voluntary contributions as part of the unified work 
program in order to improve prioritization, effectiveness and oversight of FAO’s 
work (FAO 2009:26). 
 
Changes in program delivery are regarded as a substantial sign of reconstruction 
(Clay & Stokke 2000:383). FAO reform revolves around decreasing high direct 
and indirect costs to benefit program delivery (IEE 2007:344).  
4.5 Interpretation of findings 
The period between 2000 and 2005 saw an unprecedented increase of donor 
contributions to the different components of aid assistance. The peak in 
contributions from DAC members between 2004 and 2005 (shown in figure 1) is 
mainly due to additional funds for emergency operations for the earthquake and 
tsunami in the Indian Ocean on 26 December 2004. This development is clear 
reflected in the contributions received by the two more emergency oriented 
organizations, WFP and UNICEF. Since it has not been possible to find reliable 
sources that show contributions received by FAO, it hasn’t either been possible to 
draw similar conclusions regarding the donor’s allocation towards FAO. 
However, the FAO budget proposal for the years 2000-2005 shows no larger 
increase in needs.  
 
During the period of 2005 – 2011, ODA contributions decreased in 2006 (as a 
natural cause adjusting to a post-tsunami state) up to 2008 but continued to reach 
all time high levels. The food and fuel crisis of 2007 is responded in 2008 by the 
DAC members with higher levels of contributions. From 2009 to date begins a 
downward trend in ODA contributions. UNICEF received during 2011 two times 
more in total contributions than in 2000. WFP had almost doubled their 
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contributions during the same period. FAO presented a budget for the biannual 
2010-2011 twice as big as for 2000-2001.  
4.5.1 Main findings – World Food Programme 
 
The theoretical framework of this thesis explains change as a process of identify 
and adapting to changing circumstances in their environment through a process of 
learning. The analysis conducted on WFP demonstrates, both through the 
implemented research design and by statements by WFP themselves that this 
organization has engaged in an ambitious reform process. The three analytical 
tools, reformulation/restament, adaptation and reconstruction have easily been 
matched against the actions taken by WFP towards organizational change.  
 
The statement of reposition from a food aid agency to a food assistance agency is 
consistent with the definitions of change presented in the research design. What 
distinguishes WFP's focus shift from a standardized rhetorical declaration with 
weak references regarding responsibility for execution is just that the new 
approach is presented in their Strategic Plan and marketed as a 'revolution'.  
 
The activities and changes regarding adaptation and the more ambitious form of 
institutional change, reconstruction, taken by WFP are interpreted in this paper as 
valid actions to meet the changing nature of contributions, financial crises and 
efficiency demands. The process of adaptation, according to Clay and Stokke 
(2000), usually takes place in already existing mechanisms. The changes in WFP 
strategies have primarily taken place in its existing mechanisms but new methods 
have also been added. Evaluations conducted by among others donors and 
international organizations reports that WFP is achieving most of its objectives 
and expected results.58 New methods such as cash and vouchers instead of food, 
support of smallholder/low income farmers (P4P), forward purchasing and 
preposition of food are examples of new tools of the new strategy.  
                                                
58  See DAC EVALNET 2011; AUSAID 2012; DFID Feb 2011 
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4.5.2 Main findings – UNICEF 
UNICEF has seen its share of non-core contributions undergo a major change 
since the beginning of the new millennium. 2000 was the first time in the history 
of UNICEF those non-core contributions constituted a bigger proportion of total 
resources. Only between the years 2000-2005, non-core resources had increased 
by 101,7% (Yussuf et al 2007:26). Compared to WFP, UNICEF had been able to 
maintain a certain amount of contributions directed towards core activities. Even 
though this amount of core contributions have fallen from 50% in 2000 to 30% in 
2011 (UNICEF 2011:28) UNICEF have had some positive effects on program 
delivery, including facilitating the growth of operational activities in line with the 
donors' own preferences. Therefore, the higher amounts of non-core contributions 
have not forced UNICEF to adjust its strategic framework on an institutional 
comprehensive manner.  
 
Unlike many of the UN's Specialized Agencies, Funds and Programs, UNICEF 
has managed to resource one third of its annual income from the private sector 
raised through its 36 National Committees (Yussuf et al 2007:19). When it comes 
to a general resource mobilization strategy, UNICEF has review its strategies in 
2003 and 2006 implementing new modalities such as 'thematic areas', funded by 
non-core contributions but related to the organizational priorities. WFP has also in 
recent years revised its resource mobilization strategies and working more with on 
resourcing from the private sector. Similar strategies adopted formally by the 
governing bodies of FAO have not been developed. These kinds of strategies are 
more common among the funds and programs that rely fully or heavily on 
voluntary funding than among the specialized agencies (Yussuf et al. 2007:21).   
 
Three conclusion this paper can contribute with to explain UNICEF's, in some 
way, successful dealing with adapting to challenges attached to financial crisis, 
donor conditionality and the overall changing nature of the aid system are: 
 
1. UNICEF's fragmented operational structure - a wide distribution of sectors of its 
five focus areas; 
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2. UNICEF's decentralized operational structure - decision making delegated to the 
country level and 
3. UNICEF's well-defined and incontestable mandate.  
4.5.3 Main findings – FAO 
The structure of the governing of FAO has probably come to mean a great deal in 
relation to the performance and actions taken by this organization during the 
investigated period. The low scores received in evaluations in regards to 
governance, and the immediate recommendation of the IEE report to conduct a 
reform in this area suggest that many of the challenges that FAO has been dealing 
with may originate from long before the investigated period in this thesis. It has 
not been in this essay's purpose to utilize the governing structure of the selected 
cases as explanatory variables. However, the question of the efficiency of having 
two governing bodies (Conference and Council), a Director General and 191 
members on a fix basis seems relevant. 
4.6 Summary 
The three investigated cases can all be individually considered as leaders in their 
respective areas of work. FAO, the only specialized agency included in this study, 
is the lead United Nations agency for agriculture, fisheries, forestry and rural 
development (AUSAID 2012:1). UNICEF and WFP are the two entirely 
voluntarily funded Programs and Funds established by the United Nation's 
General Assembly selected for this study. These two organizations are key players 
in humanitarian development and relief work.  
 
This thesis' point of departure has been to investigate the reaction and response of 
the selected cases to external demand for higher aid efficiency, changes in donor 
contributions and financial crises. Common to all three cases is that they confirm 
that all three factors related to financial crises, resources and demand for higher 
efficiency has affected their work and that is has been regarded as major concerns. 
The most distinctive external influences on all three cases have been the changing 
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nature of donor contributions. All three cases have experienced the overall trend 
of increased total contributions. The increase has been mainly due to higher 
amounts of contributions directed to activities selected by the donor, so called 
'non-core' contributions. These amounts are all voluntary contributions from the 
donors. By doing so, donors are bilaterally earmarking contributions for projects 
that they prefer, thus profiting from the UN "brand" without directly contributing 
to the cost of its multilateral mandate in the form of core contributions (Mahn 
2012:1).  
 
The research design applied to the FAO case has not been elementary to prove 
that FAO has engaged in institutional reform. The IEE report is a confirmation of 
this direction. That FAO started a reform process during the investigated period 
cannot solely be attributed to the changes in donor contributions, the overall 
efficiency requirement of aid actors nor the recent years economic turmoil. FAO's 
current reform process may have been only a matter of time.  
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5 Final discussion 
This chapter discusses the findings of the analysis. The organizational action 
taken by FAO, UNICEF and WFP during the investigated time frame will serve as 
the basis for the discussion on whether these actions can be attributed to the 
identified challenges in chapter one. Further, it will be discussed if the funding 
mechanism of the selected case studies is decisive for the type of response and 
actions to changing conditions and requirements. This chapter will be in 
conjunction with the theoretical framework of this thesis and discusses the 
validity of Rational Choice and New Institutionalism in explaining organizational 
and institutional change.  
5.1 Responding to change 
The processes of change within the world economy and donor behavior pose a 
challenge to international UN aid institutions with the mandate to promote 
development in poor countries. The results from the analysis indicates that despite 
that all three selected cases has been exposed to the rapidly changing environment 
in the international aid system, their response has varied. According to the 
theoretical framework, organizational change is not a uniform process or one 
broad institutional response to challenges. In this thesis, three broad types of 
institutional response have been identified: reformulation, adaptation and 
reconstruction (Clay 2003; Clay & Stokke 2000). There is nothing in the 
analytical framework mentioning that all three of the defined institutional 
responses must have been implemented for a reform process to be considered 
successful. However, Clay and Stokke mention that reconstruction is the most 
ambitious type of response and as something “unrealistic to expect” (2000:383).  
WFP is the only organization of the three investigated that is defined as having 
performed a reconstruction.  
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WFP makes a very interesting case and is the one who stands the closest to the 
theories of Rational Choice and New Institutionalism in explaining why and when 
organizations change. If not the hardest hit by the changes in the aid industry, so 
is WFP at least the one hit most directly. The natures of WFP’s operational work 
in the form of buying and delivering food was direct challenged by the soaring 
food and fuel prices in 2007-2008. But it must also be mentioned that an 
imminent problem that WFP had been tackling for a long time is the declining 
role of food aid. This has been a very serious concern for an aid agency that 
delivers its majority of aid as food. The specialized character of WFP combined 
with the fact that its income consists of about 99 % of earmarked contributions 
has reduced the flexibility of the funding in their efforts to deliver mandated 
programs.  
 
As explained by March and Olsen in section 2.1.1, institutions acts rational and 
are governed by a ‘logic of appropriateness’ that defines what the institutions and 
its members should do. The situation of WFP up until 2007, in the midst of 
soaring food and fuel prices, and the decisions taken by the their governing body 
to reconstruct WFP from an agency that delivers food aid to a new one delivering 
food assistance can be explained as an institution that has perceived the likely 
benefits of change outweighing the expected cost of change itself.  
 
The results of the analysis show UNICEF engaging in reformulation and 
adaptation during the investigated period. Why the organization did not turned to 
reconstruction is because such a need was not necessary. Although UNICEF also 
experienced outside challenges and less core funding, it was not affected as 
negative as WFP. I would like to point to the fragmented structure of UNICEF as 
a comparative advantage, giving UNICEF a position to handle challenges and 
problems in one of the focus areas separately. The theoretical framework can be 
said to fit the evidence even in the case of UNICEF.  If we look at UNICEF as a 
human construction, designed to solve collective action problems, they can only 
be 'undone' when they no longer serve actors interests. The consensus between 
UNICEF, Donors and partners regarding operational priorities together with the 
respect and admiration UNICEF enjoys among the same is another strength 
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limiting the need for engaging in more ambitious form of change to current 
challenges. 
 
The allocations assessed by FAO and its members have not increased as rapidly as 
in the other two cases. While extra budgetary funding was growing at a faster rate 
than regular/core funding in most United Nations system organizations between 
2000-2005 (Yussuf et al. 2007:iii) FAO budgets needs did not increase 
significantly. However, FAO experienced during this period a sharp decrease of 
Net Appropriations (core contributions) by 45 %. Why the donors did not 
followed their commitments to pay their assessments is not investigated. In this 
context, an organization that is membership funded is more reluctant to change. In 
the case of FAO, it was first in 2007 that an independent evaluation was 
conducted producing more than 100 recommendations to reform the organization.  
 
5.1.1 Funding mechanism and the cause of change 
The theoretical framework applied to the three cases fails to explain the behavior 
of FAO in times of need for reform, but still explain the other cases very well. For 
the two entirely voluntary funded organizations, UNICEF and WFP, the theory 
supports the causal mechanism between funding and actions taken to manage new 
challenges. Both UNICEF and WFP list changes in the funding dynamics as 
reason to adjust their resource mobilization strategies. A unique attribute of 
voluntary funded UN organizations is to receive significant amount of their total 
resources from the private sector (Yussuf et al, 2007). Both UNICEF and WFP 
have a close cooperation with donors from this sector. FAO did not have a formal 
comprehensive resource mobilization strategy at the overall corporate level and 
the development of a resource strategy was one of the recommendations of the 
IEE report.   
 
The identified actions and changes observed in the three case studies can be 
explained by their funding mechanism, but only if this casual mechanism is 
isolated from other mechanism. George and Bennet states the importance of 
having a casual mechanism as a necessary explanation, but that it is not always 
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sufficient (2005:145). This thesis has only utilized one single explanatory 
variable. Under the course of the analysis I have come to the conclusion that it 
was not enough. This is most notable in the case of FAO. Their ambiguous 
handling of necessary reform can not solely be explained by the fact that FAO is 
an assessment funded organization that does not experience the same lack of 
predictability of contributions as voluntary funded organizations experience. The 
short amounts collected, as shown in table 5, clearly indicates that FAO should 
have seen it as a call to make their resource mobilization more efficient. As 
suggestion for future research it is recommended to also include an organization’s 
government structure as an additional independent variable. By doing so, previous 
research conducted by new institutionalists focusing on the culture and value held 
by the participants in the governing processes could be applied (Peters 1998:122).    
 
Being a research area that has not previously received wide attention, a theory can 
make a rather weak claim to being ‘the best’ explanation (George & Bennet 
2005:117). Although I still relate to the validity of explaining institutional change 
as something rational and generated out of cooperation for gain maximizing, I 
don’t reject other theoretical interpretations. The phenomena of FAO could 
benefit from a single case study applying a more historical theoretic approach 
studying the original institutional design and how this has influenced future 
decision-making. For a future quantitative analysis, it will probably be necessary 
to add different values to the different variable in order to measure the grade of 
change.  
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